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Some views on the economics of Brexit 1 
 
Jeremy Peat 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this paper I attempt to bring together a selection of the economic issues that have emerged 
during the debate running up to the 23rd June EU referendum.  This selection is by no means 
complete.  Further I fully accept that there are a range of other, non-economic, issues which 
individuals may wish to take into account before they cast their vote.  Nevertheless I do hope 
that this contribution on the economic front will provide some information and views of some 
value to those making up their minds on such a critical topic. 
 
I wish to stress three points that I believe merit repetition at the outset of this IPPI Policy Brief. 
 
1. First, in discussing the economic impact of possible Brexit nothing can be certain.  We do 
not know what form exit would take or over what timetable, and we most certainly do not 
have any ideal model to examine the difference between in and out with any degree of 
precision.  Educated guesswork is the best we can hope for.  Further we have a better 
chance of being nearer correct in the short term; the uncertainties mount as we head to the 
longer term ± but that longer term is what really matters. 
 
2. I am upset by the spurious claims and unsubstantiated statements being made from both 
sides; but in particular by some of the (to be frank) arrant nonsense coming from the Vote 
Leave / exit campaign and its expectation of credibility.  It seems wrong that the uttering of 
blatant untruths is accepted.2 
 
3. But then as a child of March 1945 I am inherently pro-European from a political perspective.  
European co-operation of one type or another has been symptomatic of relative peace in 
Europe through my lifetime; and we should note that the only European, or indeed world, 
leader to come out in favour of Brexit has been Vladimir Putin.  3 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1
 This IPPI Policy Brief has emerged from a talk that I gave on 8th -XQHWRDµ'HYRQVKLUH+RXVH¶GLQQHU
However, the responsibility for the contents of the paper is entirely mine.  Perhaps more than is usual, it is important 
to stress that the views expressed are mine in a personal capacity and not those of any organisation with which I 
happen to be involved. 
2
 It was very brave of a Tory MP, Sarah Wollaston, to switch allegiance from exit to remain on the very day I gave the 
talk, and to do so because she saw the £350million per week figure of funding for the NHS (see below) as blatantly 
untrue. 
3
 Professor John Curtice tells me that Mr. Putin has not expressed this view.  Other sources say that he has ± but one 
should never really doubt Professor Curtice!  
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2. The short term 
 
The first effect of a vote for Brexit would be increased market turbulence and uncertainty.  
We have seen in recent days that sterling has tended to fall, against dollar and euro, as the 
polls have edged towards an out vote.  At the same time all measures of actual and expected 
volatility have also risen sharply ± towards levels last seen around 2008.4 
 
Forecasting exchange rates LVDPXJ¶VJDPHas I discovered several times while Group Chief 
Economist at RBS, but the expectation has to be that an out vote would signal a decline in the 
value of sterling, at least initially.  The probability is that this would also tend to be associated 
with the futures markets signaling expectations of higher interest rates ± yield curves would 
probably shift upwards.  Goodness knows by how much or for how long. 
 
3. Macro-economic impacts 
 
The Treasury modeled the macro-economic impact5 of 3 scenarios ± where the UK joins the 
European Economic Area (EEA ± along with Iceland, Norway and Lichtenstein; Switzerland has 
negotiated a bilateral treaty); where the UK negotiates bilateral agreements; and where the UK 
takes what the WTO delivers.   
 
Their calculations have of course been seen as biased by out campaigners.  I have not analysed 
their work in any detail and hence simply quote their results as one source of evidence. What 
the Treasury calculations suggest is that GDP would, after 15 years, be 3.8% lower under the 
first scenario and 6.2% and 7.5% respectively in scenarios 2 and 3.  This amounts to GDP per 
household being lower by £2,600, £4,300 and £5,200 respectively. 
 
Mark Carney has stated ± and a Bank of England Governor usually weighs his words with care 
± that the risks of the UK leaving the EU ³could possibly include a technical recession´. 
 
Certainly one should expect the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to consider raising interest 
rates as volatility struck and sterling depreciated (raising inflation risks).  But at the same time 
the MPC would be wary of tightening policy if there were risks of any sharp slowdown in growth.  
There would be major policy dilemmas on the monetary front as well as major uncertainties with 
regard to the state of the public finances and the outlook for sterling. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4
 See Financial Times page 2, 7th June 2016. 
5
 See HMT April 2016. 
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4. The public finances 
 
Turning to the public finances, it is here that the out campaigners have waxed most lyrical ± 
and wrong.  One pronouncement (from Michael Gove) that I particularly admired was the claim 
that if we left the EU then we would not be required to add indirect taxation to fuel duties and 
therefore all drivers could look forward to lower prices for petrol and diesel.   
 
Of course we could cut fuel duties if we left the EU, but how then would the massive gap in the 
public finances be filled ± what cuts would be made in public expenditure and what higher taxes 
elsewhere?  Or would Mr. Gove simply let the deficit grow dramatically?  And what would he do 
about our climate change obligations?  Simply ignore the sharp rise in emission levels as petrol 
and diesel consumption rocketed? 
 
The more regular claim is that anointed on the Vote Leave battle bus - that being in the EU 
costs the UK £350m per week; money which if we left could be spent on the NHS. 
 
£350m per week amounts to some £18bn pa.  This is about the amount that the UK would, in 
principle, be paying per year over the coming years.  But this is by no means the end of the 
story ± as even those on the Vote Leave battle bus must know. 
 
Some one quarter of that amount is never paid over to Brussels6WKDWLV0DJJLH7¶VUHEDWHVWLOO
at work.  Further, some £5billion comes back to the UK via the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), structural funds and research funding etc.  The net UK contribution is some £150million 
per week or £8billion pa in total. 
 
And it cannot even be claimed that we could have this £8billion to spend on the NHS ± desirable 
as that would be.  The IFS has agreed that leaving the EU would free up £8billion ± in the sense 
that it would not be paid to Brussels.  That point was seized upon by Mr. Gove - and then 
abused.  The IFS ± who I trust and respect as objective and informed ± went on the state that:  
 
³«HYHQDVPDOOQHJDWLYHHIIHFWRIMXVW0.6% on national income from leaving the 
EU would damage the public finances by more than that £8billion.  There is virtual 
unanimity among forecasters that the negative economic effect of leaving the EU 
ZRXOGEHJUHDWHUWKDQWKDW´7 
 
So Brexit ZRXOG³OHDYHXVVSHQGLQJOHVVRQSXEOLFVHUYLFHVRUWD[LQJPRUHRUERUURZLQJPRUH´8 
                                                        
6
 In response to Sarah Wollaston John Redwood stated that £350million was the gross figure.  That all depends upon 
definition.  ,ZRXOGUDWKHUVHHµJURVV¶DVGHILQLQJWKHDPRXQWactually paid over to Brussels, i.e. £350 million less the 
Thatcher rebate. 
7
 And compare this figure with the HMT figures cited above. 
8
 As quoted in Financial Times, 7th June 2016 
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There is another wrinkle to this argument.  If we exit then I believe that all are agreed that we 
will need some deal to maintain access to the European single market.  One route is via the 
EEA.  Members of this organisation have to adopt some EU laws and contribute financially to 
the cost of the single market.  And no funding comes back to them.  Their gross spend equates 
to their net spend and in the case of Norway this amounted to £106 per head in 2011.  This is 
WREHFRPSDUHGZLWKWKH8.¶VQHWSHUKHDG p.a. ± and for Scotland £64 per head p.a., as 
we gain far more from CAP, structural funds and research awards than does the UK as a whole.  
So Norway spends more than Scotland and nearly as much as the UK to be outwith the EU, 
but inside the single market.9 I would further note (see below regarding non-tariff barriers) that 
this spend by Norway achieves a far less satisfactory deal on access to the market than the UK 
has as an EU member state. 
 
In sum the £350million per week is fraudulent because: - 
 
1. It does not allow for the Thatcher rebate 
2. It does not allow for the EU funds received back by UK 
3. It does not allow for losses on the public finances as a result of UK leaving; and 
4. It does not allow for the costs of EEA entry or any other means of the UK subsequently 
accessing the single market. 
 
5. Three areas of Scottish interest 
 
Let me turn to three areas of specific interest to Scotland.  First trade, where the key markets 
for us are the rest of the UK and the EU. 
 
Out campaigners blithely assume that not only can we readily re-claim the unfettered access to 
the single market but that as a lone agent ± and member of the WTO in our own right ± we can 
expect to negotiate far better deals than does the EU with third countries such as the USA, 
China, India, Brazil and Japan. 
 
Let us first note that the USA, Japan, China, India, et. al. all want the UK to stay in ± all bar Mr. 
Putin10.  I have already noted that there is a route to the single market via the European 
Economic Area or bilateral negotiations, as in the case of Switzerland.  But (a) this is not free 
in terms of money or wider obligations and (b) we would not start on the best of terms with the 
remaining member states.  Out campaigners will tell you that the EU exports more to us than 
we export to them.  Correct; but that does not mean that they would be gagging for a trade deal 
with the UK.  We export far more to the EU than any single member state exports to us.  From 
                                                        
9
 See Professor David BeOO¶V&KDSWHULQµ%ULWDLQ¶V'HFLVLRQ)DFWVDQG,PSDUWLDO$QDO\VLVIRUWKH8.5HIHUHQGXPRQ
-XQH¶SXEOLVKHGE\WKH'DYLG+XPH,QVWLWXWHWKH&HQWUHIRU&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&KDQJHDQGWKH+XQWHU
Foundation. 
10
 Noting again that Prof. Curtice could be correct. 
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the perspective of each remaining EU member state, negotiating a UK deal would be far less 
important than it would be to us.  
 
Indeed the UK is no longer the huge economy to which all states in the world would give priority 
to on the treaty negotiation front. 
 
President Obama and George Osborne KDYHWROGXVWKDWIRUD86$GHDOµWKH8.ZRXOGKDYHWR
go to the back of the queue [or line, if you prefer].¶Dieter Helm, another worthy of some respect, 
has stated11 WKDWµWKHUHDOity is that the US and other trade deals will take at least a decade to 
DJUHH¶'DYLG(LVer ± now of the Fraser of Allander Institute at the University of Strathclyde - in 
a David Hume Institute (DHI) publication12 ,FRPPHQGWR\RXKDVFRQILUPHGWKDWµWKHUHDUHIHZ
examples of countries making bilateral trade deals of anything like the scope that EU member 
VWDWHVVKDUH¶ 
 
So on trade we would face at the very least an extended period of uncertainty and in all 
probability an expensive deal with the EU ± in the fullness of time; and less than ideal treaties 
with other emerging and emerged states ± again when they saw fit.  One final thought on this 
topic; LSE researchers13 have concluded that even when countries have comprehensive deals 
as provided by EEA membership, their trade with the EU is still less than it would be under full 
EU membership ± not least because of higher non-tariff barriers which weigh particularly heavily 
upon service sector trade, including and perhaps especially financial services. 
 
Next I turn to a brief word on inward investment.  The UK has been the largest recipient of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) since 1993; and Scotland has been the most successful region 
of the UK outwith London.   
 
These investors come to Scotland and the UK for a variety of reasons.  They are often keen on 
access to the EU market ± which would be in doubt.  > RI LQYHVWRUV LQ (<¶V  µ8.
DWWUDFWLYHQHVV¶ VXUYH\ FRQVLGHU DFFHVV WR WKH (8¶V VLQJOH PDUNHW DV LPSRUWDQW WR WKH 8.¶V
attractiveness as a destination for FDI.]  They approve of the ready availability of many types 
of skilled labour ± which could be at risk where EU nationals are concerned.   
 
There are of course a number of other powerful reasons for actual and potential foreign 
investors valuing a UK base; reasons which should not be exposed to risk by Brexit.  Overall, 
however, I simply cannot accept that the UK leaving the EU, with all the uncertainties that would 
impose, could do anything but seriously hamper our ability to attract further FDI.  Indeed my 
                                                        
11
 'LHWHU+HOPµth June ± WKHGD\DIWHUWKHUHIHUHQGXPRQ8.PHPEHUVKLS¶th May 2016; available at 
www.dieterhel.co.uk/publications. 
12
 %ULWDLQ¶V'HFLVLRQRS. cit. 
13
 $VTXRWHGE\'DYLG&RPHUIRUGLQFKDSWHURI%ULWDLQ¶V'HFLVLRQRS. cit. 
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expectation would be that the owners of some existing FDI operations would at least consider 
whether a move away from the UK would make sense following Brexit.  Some hints have already 
been dropped to this effect. 
 
Finally a word on financial services ± and here I am grateful to Owen Kelly, former CEO of 
Scottish Financial Enterprise (SFE), for his chapter in the DHI book14. 
 
As Owen notes, a key issue for this sector ± which despite the decline of RBS and HBOS still 
matters so much for Scotland ± LVWKDWRIµSDVVSRUWLQJULJKWV¶.  These allow a provider of financial 
services to operate throughout the EU from a single base.  Again it is not only EU member 
states that have these rights.  Some states have negotiated for the rights, in full or in part, at a 
cost and subject to further conditions, as has Switzerland on a bilateral basis.  So again there 
would be major uncertainties and again there would be real and longer-term risks.  
 
To cite Owen Kelly IXUWKHU³7KH8.ILQDQFLDOVHUYLFHVVHFWRUEHQHILWVGLVSURSRUWLRQDWHO\IURP
the trade deals negotiated by the EU as it is larger than that of any other EU state.  Without EU 
clout, the UK could not get the same preferential terms.  7KH86KDVDOUHDG\VDLGDVPXFK¶ 
 
,QVXPVD\V2ZHQ³OHDYLQJWKH8.ZRXOGEHFRVWO\GLVUXSWLYHDQGGDPDJLQJ´ 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
I think that by now you will know where I am coming from!  But allow me to conclude.  
 
1. First, the only certainty is much heightened uncertainty.  This applies to the economic outlook 
and so much more.  Staying in the EU raises uncertainties ± what will happen to the 
Eurozone as the stresses and strains continue?  Will the UK be able to maintain its semi-
detached position?  However exiting would raise even more.  We would live in an 
increasingly uncertain world. 
 
2. Second, it is by no means implausible that the UK could flourish outwith the EU.  Maybe in 
a less regulated State, WKH 8.¶V µDQLPDO VSLULWV¶ ZRXOG EH XQOHDVKHG, entrepreneurialism 
would be rife, our competitiveness would be enhanced and over time we would become the 
Singapore of Europe.  
 
3. But third, all the logical and considered arguments to me point to the benefit of staying rather 
than leaving.  Please cast a skeptical eye over everything said on this complex topic.  But I 
suggest a far more critical eye on Messrs. Gove, Farage, Duncan Smith and Johnson than 
on the President of the US, the Heads of the WTO and OECD and even the Governor of the 
Bank of England. 
                                                        
14
 &KDSWHURI%ULWDLQ¶V'HFLVLRQRSFLW 
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